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This paper will examine how various conceptualizations of trauma are produced through specific 
social, historical, and political contexts, and the effects of such conceptualizations in regards to 
race, gender, disability, and capitalist relations of power. I will first describe the theoretical 
orientation of this analysis in critical theory and critical disability studies. Following Lawrence 
and Dua (2005), who assert that “ongoing colonization and decolonization struggles must be 
foundational in our understanding of racism, racial subjectivities, and antiracism” (p. 131), I begin 
my discussion of trauma through an analysis of how the discourse of trauma as well as healing 
have enabled tactics of nation-building in Canada and sustained ongoing violence against and 
control over Indigenous, racialized, and gendered bodies. Through a review of critical feminist 
and disability theorizations on reason and emotions, I then examine the historical development of 
trauma as a psycho-medical concept and its relationships with psychiatric categorization and 
knowledge. Finally, I will address the tension between the politicization of trauma and corporeal 
realities of distress and pain, and propose that enacting the former may open up more possibilities 
to care for the latter by resisting conditions that give rise to distress in the first place.         
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1 The phrase “leak everywhere” is borrowed from an untitled poem by Athena, published in a set of artist cards 
titled Blossom in 2 Freedom: The Journey Within (YWCA Toronto, 2013).  
Introduction: Why Trauma? 
 
In North America, the term trauma-informed practice has become increasingly commonplace in 
mental health services over the past two decades (Goodman, 2015). Broadly defined, trauma-
informed practice refers to the delivery of human services that is grounded by an understanding of 
the complex effects of devastating events in individuals’ lives (Manitoba Trauma Information and 
Education Centre, 2013). Moreover, underpinned by feminist politicization of violence against 
women in the 1970s and 80s, this practice model considers the connections between mental distress 
and social injustices (Goodman, 2015). However, studies on services for women who have 
experienced violence show that a pervasive pathologizing discourse continues to reinforce an 
individualist, Eurocentric, colonial, and heteropatriarchal perspective of normalcy in these services 
(Burnette et al., 2015; Burstow, 2003; Egan, 2016; Goodman, 2015; Koyama, 2006; Tseris, 2013; 
Ussher, 2011; Wathen et al., 2015). Indeed, Goodman (2015) identifies that there is a tendency 
amongst service providers to uncritically equate trauma-informed practice with social justice, and 
urges that “we critically examine the practices that are being operationalized as trauma-informed 
and question how and in what ways they might actually perpetuate injustice” (p. 56). 
Encouragingly, there is a growing body of literature that critically engages with the 
conceptualizations of trauma and the ways they shape practices of support. A few examples include 
studies and theorizations from Indigenous scholarship (Chrisjohn & McKay, 2017; Linklater, 
2014; Million, 2013), mental health services (Tseris, 2013; 2016), shelter and social services 
(Burnette et al., 2015; Koyama, 2006), social work (Brown, 2011), and counselling and 
psychotherapy (Burstow, 2003; Egan, 2016; Goodman, 2015; Stevens, 2016), notably the critical 
reframing of historically depoliticized therapeutic methods as forms of social and collective 
activism (Haines, 2020).  
 
Following the footsteps of writers and practitioners who resist individualist and pathologizing 
definitions of trauma, I come to this research with the experiences of surviving discrimination and 
psychiatrization as an immigrant racialized cisgender woman, and working over the past decade 
with people who have experienced violence as a mental health service provider. I have borne 
witness to, been devastated by, and benefitted from the colonial structures that continue to manifest 
in the mental health system in promoting and coercing conformity to whiteness, capitalist 
discipline, and heteropatriarchy. As such, my study is grounded in the belief that violence against 
women is produced through the widespread cultural devaluation of the feminized and racialized 
bodies and minds; if women seek support in mental health services for the violence and injustice 
they experience, then the pathologization and subjugation of women in these setting are doubly 
unjust (Shildrick, 1997). Feminist writers in disability studies have also long been asserting that, 
in heteropatriarchal societies, the subjugation of disabled people is necessarily gendered, whereby 
the feminine is constructed as disabled and lacking in comparison to the masculine ideal (Garland-
Thomson, 2005; Wendell, 1996; Young, 1980). Wendell (1996) thus similarly postulates that 
disabled women are doubly rejected as signifiers of human conditions that are deemed undesirable.   
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This paper will examine how various conceptualizations of trauma are produced through specific 
social, historical, and political contexts, and the effects of such conceptualizations in regards to 
race, gender, disability, and capitalist relations of power. I will first describe the theoretical 
orientation of this analysis in critical theory and critical disability studies. Understanding that race- 
and gender-based violence as well as widely-accepted therapeutic practices are produced and 
sustained through the perpetuation of colonial structures in North America today, I follow 
Lawrence and Dua (2005) in asserting that “ongoing colonization and decolonization struggles 
must be foundational in our understanding of racism, racial subjectivities, and antiracism” (p. 131). 
I therefore begin the discussion of trauma on how Canada as a nation is established and sustained 
through ongoing violence against and control over Indigenous, racialized, and gendered bodies. 
Through a review of critical feminist and disability theorizing on reason and emotions, I will then 
examine the historical development of trauma as a psycho-medical concept and its relationships 
with psychiatric categorization and knowledge. Finally, I will address the tension between the 
politicization of trauma and corporeal realities of distress and pain, and propose that enacting the 
former may open up more possibilities to care for the latter by resisting conditions that give rise to 
distress in the first place. 
         
Sharpening Tools: Theoretical Orientations 
 
Following Lorde (2007), who wrote that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house” (p. 112), Ahmed (2017) urged for the finding and making of tools that can dismantle 
heteropatriarchal structures while avoiding the replication of norms within these structures. Since 
the 19th century there has been no shortage of psycho-medical theories of trauma (Appignanesi, 
2008; Bergo, 2007; Leys, 2000); my search for theoretical frameworks to unpack 
conceptualizations of trauma does not follow these paths, for doing so would be to reinscribe the 
ideological structures already cemented by the master’s tools. I therefore turn to critical theory and 




In his explanation of critical theory of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer (1975) emphasizes the 
elimination of oppression and injustices through tracing historical contexts and understanding how 
“such abuses as necessarily connected with the way in which the social structure is organized” (p. 
207), while being “suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and 
valuable, as these are understood in the present order” (Horkheimer, 1975). Though critical theory 
understands capitalist systems of production as major organizing forces in modern society 
(Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009), its analysis aims to expose the operations and effects of power 
beyond the economic realm (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). This interest in diverse social 
systems and relations overlaps with Foucault’s (1990) theorization of power. According to 
Foucault, “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
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endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular 
society” (p. 93), which produces, shapes, and are reproduced by all types of social relations as well 
as the injustices and inequalities within them. Through this network of relations unfolds a 
symbiotic connection between power and knowledge, in which the “exercise of power perpetually 
creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 52, as cited in Shildrick, 1997, p. 15). Thus, it is through discourse that power and 
knowledge operate in tandem (Foucault, 1990). Discourse is defined as both an apparatus and 
effect of power, and includes the constructions of meaning, the structure of language, the material 
practices it produces and authorizes, and the tactics that operate within networks of forces 
(Foucault, 1990; Shildrick, 1997). What is perceived as reality is then never accessible outside of 
multiple mediating, shifting, and conflicting discourses (Shildrick, 1997). This understanding of 
discourse thus rejects grand narratives, universal categories, and fixed binaries. Referencing past 
shortcomings of feminist attempts to arrive at universal categories and causal theories, Brown 
(2006) argues that critical theory can offer the complexity and self-reflexivity that feminism 
requires in reinvigorating its theoretical and political work. She highlights the Frankfurt School’s 
commitment to critique and openness to multiple analytical frames in language, the psyche, 
sexuality, and thought. As “gender takes shape in and as thinking and forms of rationality” (p. 4), 
critical theory may be useful in addressing the question of “what produces ready compliance with 
prevalent gender norms, including those that circulate women’s subordination” (p. 5), even in 
practices that claim a feminist orientation to social justice.  
 
Critical Disability Studies  
 
Drawing on critical theory, critical disability studies extend as well as critique the social model of 
disability, which has emerged through disability rights movements in Britain in the 1970s and 80s 
(Shakespeare, 2013). While the social model also examines the systemic subjugation of disability 
through capitalist relations and emphasizes emancipation (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009), 
critical disability scholars challenge the social model’s binary conceptualizations of impairment 
as biologically determined and disability as socially constituted (Tremain, 2006). Instead, Tremain 
(2006) argues that what is perceived as impairment is also socially and politically constituted as 
an effect of biopolitics, which refers to a strategic mobilization of power and knowledge to 
rationalize, classify, and regulate human experiences as population problems that require 
governmental management. Critical disability studies thus investigate and expose how power 
operates through conceptualizations of disability and impairment as well as seemingly benevolent 
institutional measures that regulate the subjectivities and material realities of disabled people 
through capitalist and ableist norms (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). Moreover, in moving away 
from positivistic categories, critical disability studies address the multiple, shifting, intersecting, 
and contradicting subjectivities and experiences of disability by urging self-reflexivity and 
drawing on critical feminist, legal, and race theories (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). Most 
notably, they advocate ongoing evaluation of movements and rhetoric that have garnered political 
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and economic benefits for disabled people, in order to address the concerns and agency as well as 
neglect and marginalization of those excluded from these movements (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 
2009). Feminist disability scholars and activists have persistently argued that women’s experiences 
have largely been overshadowed or erased by male-centric agendas in disability studies (Meekosha 
& Shuttleworth, 2009), and that their experiences of psychiatric and disability oppression are 
inseparable from heteropatriarchal norms and gender-based violence (Frazee, Gilmour & 
Mykitiuk, 2006; Diamond, 2013). Further, critical feminist theories extend disability studies by 
investigating embodiment and the processes through which bodies are interpellated as abnormal 
and inferior at the intersections of gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability (Garland-Thomson, 
2005). This critical engagement with difference and complexities as a shared strategy for change 
underpin critical disability studies’ core goal of emancipation (Spagnuolo, 2016). As Graham and 
Jackson (2016) state, “[by] respecting this diversity and viewing it as an asset, we will emerge 
under many banners with a stronger voice” (p. 282, 287).  
 
This paper takes a critical stance that refuses to accept trauma as an ahistorical, natural category 
that simply describes overwhelming events or people who have been impacted by them. Instead, I 
follow the delineation of critical trauma studies by Stevens (2016) in understanding trauma “as a 
cultural object whose function produces particular types of subjects” (p. 20), practices that provide 
explanations of realities, organizing frameworks for interpersonal and material relations, and 
network of meanings for understanding temporality and embodiment, through particular 
constructions of “overwhelming events” (p. 26). In other words, this critical examination reveals 
“the processes by which things that happen are denoted as trauma” (Wertheimer & Casper, 2016, 
p. 3). Further, in my understanding, investigating how emotions can be gendered and pathologized 
through discourse of trauma is an act of feminist and disability resistance. It is a way of sharpening 
tools: sharpening the analytical focus on unquestioned objectivity with feminist and disability 
knowledge (Ahmed, 2017). It is a practice of talking back, “a political gesture that challenges 
politics of domination that would render us nameless and voiceless” (hooks, 2015, p. 8). It is a 
necessary endeavour toward a less violent future. 
 
Nation-making Through Trauma 
 
Pain is Part of This Land 
 
The legitimacy of Canada’s constitution as a nation is necessarily built upon violence against and 
regulation of Indigenous peoples through a pervasive and enduring moral, gendered, and racialized 
discourse, which collapses “the rich diversity of Indigenous polities into a unified subject ‘Indian’” 
(p. 6). Lawrence (2003) argues that the Indian Act operationalizes a form of normative violence, 
an “organizing… conceptual framework that has shaped contemporary Native life in ways that are 
now so familiar as to almost seem natural” (p. 3, cited in Million, 2013, p. 6). This normative 
4 
 
violence is operated through the hierarchical patriarchy, heterosexual norms, and gender 
inequalities embedded within the Act, which fundamentally alter gender relationships in 
Indigenous communities and have direct implications in the ongoing and unchecked violence 
against Indigenous women, trans people, and two-spirited people. Importantly, Million (2013) 
argues that sexual violence and rape “interrupts and dissolves the ontological presence of person 
and community” (p. 37), which is inextricably entwined with the “powers of the nation to 
reproduce itself, whether through child-bearing, parenting, or its spirit to endure and go on” (p. 
38). Sexual violence thus occludes communities’ ability to sustain a sense of health that is 
foundational to self-determination, while state-sanctioned gender inequities continually shape new 
polities that define and articulate Indigenous self-government.  
 
The Uneven Circulation of Shame  
 
A key component within the process of colonization, shame is defined by Million (2013) as an 
embodied sociality, “a social/body relationship, in part a felt analysis, an assessment of your 
perceived status” (p. 48) within a community. The trauma experienced collectively by First 
Nations communities is described as a result of “being totally stripped of the knowledges that 
informed you how to live in your place” (p. 163). Residential schools effectively produce shame 
through coerced assimilation and moral education vis-à-vis a hierarchy of race. Foucault (1995) 
discusses the technique of ranking as integral in producing compliance for effective population 
management. In his case example of the French military school, students are ranked according to 
“the moral qualities of the pupils and on their universally recognized behaviour” (p. 181), with the 
lowest rung of the hierarchy being the “shameful class” (p. 182). They would be driven by the 
shame of being segregated from others to endeavour rising to higher classes through “the change 
in their conduct” (Foucault, 1995). As such, the “shameful class existed only to disappear” 
(Foucault, 1995, emphasis added), with differences eliminated and every body behaving according 
to the norm. Foucault’s theorization of the body as a site of disciplinary power has been critiqued 
for its lack of attention to how women, racialized subjects, and those whose sexualities exist 
outside of the gender binary are differentially constituted and impacted than his seemingly 
universal subject (Federici, 2014; Shildrick, 2997). For these groups, while their differences are 
suppressed they do not simply disappear into the ideal class. As Ahmed (2004) writes, “we feel 
shame because we have failed to approximate ‘an ideal’” (p. 106, emphasis in original), often a 
kind of moral ideal that is “bound up with the reproduction of social norms, in particular, with 
norms of sexual conduct” (Ahmed, 2004). Referring to colonial education, Ahmed (2010) further 
explains that its goal is for the colonized to become like the colonizer but “still to inhabit a body 
that is markedly different from that of the colonizer” (p. 129). Given that the bodies of Indigenous 
peoples, particularly Indigenous women, are always already marked as deviant and threatening 
through a raced and gendered discourse of Indigenous sexuality, the failure to live up to the ideal 
of whiteness is inevitable and simultaneously “a way of taking up that ideal and confirming its 
necessity” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 106). Thus, shame in this context segregates those who are othered 
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at the same time as it integrates them back into a colonial logic that defines their identity as lack. 
Indigenous people’s experiences of shame and its resulting devastation of personhood are therefore 
foundational in Canada’s nation-making through moral governance.  
 
In recent years, Million (2013) observes that shame is again evoked in the framing of colonial 
violence through a human rights discourse. Such framing positions Canada as perpetrator of abuse 
whose actions should be named and shamed; however, it simultaneously constructs the colonized 
subject as a trauma victim in need of healing. Such healing is often associated with the 
conceptualization of trauma as a psychological pathology that effectively bypasses issues of 
sovereignty and self-determination by focusing on “state-determined biopolitical programs for 
emotional and psychological self-care informed by trauma” (p. 6). This psychological and 
neoliberal discourse of trauma stresses personal responsibilities in overcoming individual 
dysfunctions for the purpose of being a productive citizen, while reconciliation between the 
perpetrator and victim is understood as necessary for healing. This defines healing as “a promised 
safety and revitalization from past colonial violence” (p. 8), thus implying that violence is no 
longer present and that the state is benevolent. Replicating racist ideology that justifies 
colonization in the first place, “[h]ealing from trauma begins to be narrated as a prerequisite to 
self-determination” (p. 105). Thus, “any actual political power for Canadian Indigenous Peoples 
is continuously deferred to a future self-healing” (p. 12, emphasis added). Ahmed (2004) defines 
emotions not as psychological states that reside within bodies, but as social and cultural practices 
that are shaped through relationships between bodies, which in turn produce and reinscribe 
relations of power and subjectivities that animate such relations. As such, it may be understood 
that through the discourse of trauma the state is able to express shame in apologizing and 
repositioning itself as an ideal, while simultaneously framing Indigenous peoples as responsible 
for their affective management of shame and trauma from colonial violence (Million, 2013). The 
apparent failure to heal and progress toward a productive liberal subjecthood may even bring about 
more shame. Shame as an emotion thus mobilizes the discourse of trauma to maintain a relation 
of custodianship and domination between the state and Indigenous peoples, with the tendency to 
stick to bodies that are always already marked as inadequate in order to sustain this relationship 
(Ahmed, 2004).   
 
Felt Knowledge of Nation-building and Dismantling 
 
In Million’s (2013) articulation of “felt theory” (p. 56), colonialism is defined as a “felt, affective 
relationship” (p.46), whereby “[m]oral stigmata are produced and attached to race, gender, and 
sexuality as lived structures of feeling: intuited, perceived, felt, and finally, in this circuit expressed 
as emotions” (p. 46). A matrix of raced and gendered nuances and practices, charged with 
emotional meanings, generates enduring, moral common knowledge about Indigenous people as 
“a ‘profane’ figure, dehumanized and not worthy of regard” (p. 48). As such, within academia the 
work of Indigenous women scholars continue to be invalidated “as polemic, or, at worst, not as 
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knowledge at all” (Million, 2013, p. 57). She cites scholars who have endeavoured “to prove they 
are not already guilty of being what the state believes them to be” (p. 64) through recounting state 
violence, domestic abuse, systemic discrimination, as well as survival, resistance, and community 
reconnections. While these narratives have gained popular attention through (primarily white) 
feminist mobilization for women’s rights and the expansion of therapeutic interventions in 
Indigenous communities since the 1970s, issues of self-determination and intersecting 
discriminations remain obscured by colonial perspectives that also permeate feminist movements, 
and mainstream society routinely equates social distress with individual pathology. Nevertheless, 
these affective narratives expose sexual violence as apparatus of colonial control, thereby 
disrupting the reproduction of social knowledge that positions Indigenous women’s sexuality as 
inherently deviant, and may potentially “displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition 
itself” (Butler, 1990, p. 203, emphasis in original). Million (2013) challenges the individual-
focused discourse of trauma, as well as the broader devaluation of emotions in western philosophy, 
by theorizing experiences of trauma as a form of affective knowledge, the expressions of which 
can “transport us to another place, compel us to look at horrors and, more importantly, enable us 
to imagine a new society” (Kelley, 2002, as cited in Million, 2013, p. 30). This incites a movement 
of emotions that can connect bodies across differences and link the affective to the political by 
relating community distress to the patriarchal social order imposed by colonial policies (Ahmed, 
2004), as these stories have proven to be instrumental in shifting discussions about residential 
schools, gender norms, and colonial relations within political arenas and the social collective 
imaginary (Million, 2013). 
 
Leak Everywhere: Trauma and Gendered Emotions 
 
The dismissal of Indigenous women’s affective stories as polemic or not as knowledge at all is 
unmistakably underpinned by the association of women with unreason and emotionality in western 
philosophy, and the development of trauma as a psychological concept is entangled within this 
gendered discourse of emotions. Following Shildrick (1997), this analysis of gender is not 
grounded in a fixed ontological category of women as an exclusive target of oppression, but rather 
on the questions of “how any body becomes en-gendered as feminine or masculine” (p. 47), and 
“how meaning, particularly representations of gender, are mobilized within the operations of 
power to produce asymmetrical relations amongst subjects” (Shildrick, 1997). 
 
A Gendered History of Embodiment and Unreason                  
 
Tracing medical texts from the Renaissance, Shildrick (1997) demonstrates how feminine 
inferiority is discursively constructed through cultural and medical knowledge about the 
reproductive process. Evident in writings by Aristotle and Galen, the female body is positioned as 
a passive, empty container lacking in the “principle of soul” (Lloyd, 1996, p. 150), existing only 
for the active spirit of the male body to take form, reflecting Judaeo-Christian narratives of creation 
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(Shildrick, 1997). Through the European Enlightenment and its cementation of the Cartesian 
mind/body binary as fundamental to human life, men are positioned as the “self-present, self-
authorizing subject” (Shildrick, 1997, p. 26) who could transcend their corporality to access pure 
reason that is uncontaminated by the senses. Menstruation and pregnancy are read as evidence of 
women’s lack of control over the containment of their bodies (by leaking vital blood) and the 
boundaries of their selves (by simultaneously being self and other). As such, women are 
understood as intrinsically enmeshed with and therefore incapable of transcending their own 
bodies, leading to beliefs that women lack intellectual and moral agency. This gendered discourse 
of feminine inferiority is therefore foundational to and mutually constituting with ableism, 
whereby disabled people are often perceived as dependent, helpless, intellectually challenged, 
abnormal, and perpetually childlike, thus embodying characteristics that are constructed, devalued, 
and pathologized as the opposite of the masculine norm (Crawford & Ostrove, 2003; Ahlvik-Harju, 
2016; Kafer, 2013). Feminist writers theorize that disabled and feminized bodies destabilize and 
disturb the normative understanding of corporality as controllable and self-contained (Garland-
Thomson, 2005; Shildrick, 1997; Wendell, 1996). This gendered and ableist logic thus work in 
tandem with colonial and Enlightenment rationale to shape the hierarchical opposition between 
male-culture and female-nature, which justifies the regulation of nature as “wild and chaotic, but…  
potentially controllable” (Shildrick, 1997, p. 26). On the flipside of this logic, the white, European 
subject “is initiated in its subjecthood through its capacity to affect, and not to be affected” 
(Gorman, 2017, p.311, emphasis in original). In this binary the racialized other is presupposed as 
affectable, and the mad as “a failure of articulable emotion, a giving-over to affect” (Gorman, 
2017, p. 311). As such, cultural processes of feminization and racialization are enabled through 
discursive constructions of emotions, which are positioned “‘beneath’ the faculties of thought and 
reasons” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 3), with “a much lower and animal-like condition” (Darwin, 1904, p. 
14, cited in Ahmed, 2004, p. 3). The intersecting discourses of race, gender, and disability in the 
construction and regulation of human normalcy have deleterious effects, as racialized women and 
women with intellectual disabilities, for example, have historically been subjected to eugenic 
programs, coerced institutionalization, forced rehabilitation, involuntary sterilization and abortion, 
and medically unnecessary surgeries for the ease of caregiving or to normalize bodily appearances 
(Ahlvik-Harju, 2016; Carlson, 2010; Kafer, 2013). These can be understood as disciplinary 
technologies that uphold dominant norms by reinforcing the widespread belief that particular 
bodies and minds do not undeserve a future (Kafer, 2013).   
 
Recovering What’s Not There: Trauma and Hysteria in Bio-psychiatry 
 
The earliest conceptualizations of psychic trauma are founded in Freud’s theorization of hysteria 
(Leys, 2000). In the 1890s, Freud suggested that sexual violence was at the core of the “hysterical 
shattering of the personality consequent on a situation of extreme terror or fright” (Leys, 2000, p. 
4). The historical conceptualization of hysteria reaches back to the time of ancient Egyptians and 
Greeks, premised on the belief that uncontrollable movements of the uterus, or “wandering womb” 
8 
 
(Appignanesi, 2008, p. 162), are the cause of a wide range of ailments seen in women, echoing 
discursive constructions of the female body as inherently lacking boundaries and control 
(Shildrick, 1997). With the advancement of technologies and the medical profession, the 
intertwining theories of hysteria and trauma emerged in the 19th century through biological 
psychiatry, which drew on neurosciences to explain and treat psychological conditions (Shorter, 
1997). French neurologist Charcot’s public theatrical displays of the hysterical trance and hypnotic 
cure at the Salpêtrière hospital in the 1860s played a major role in propagating the image of the 
hysterical woman (Appignanesi, 2008). Performed by female patients under hypnosis, these 
theatrical displays aimed to validate Charcot’s characterizations of hysteria, including erotic 
gestures, intense affect such as weeping and raging, and the retelling of sexual experiences or 
trauma (Appignanesi, 2008). The female patient is thereby positioned as in need of rescue by the 
all-knowing male doctor who could wake and cure her from her own primitive state of unreason 
and insanity, grounded in the underlying cultural belief that women require male control to make 
them whole and stable (Shildrick, 1997).  
 
In late 1890s Freud shifted away from his belief in the role of sexual exploitation in trauma, and 
instead reoriented his work to repressed erotic wishes, thus relegating stories of childhood sexual 
abuse to the realm of fantasies (Murphy, 2007). Freud was not the first to dismiss the impacts of 
sexual violence in the medical field. Despite eliciting and analyzing female patients’ accounts of 
their sexual experiences, physicians such as Pinel and Charcot considered sexual violence merely 
as environmental factors; it was the degeneration of the female reproductive and nervous systems 
that persistently figured as the central cause of hysteria (Appignanesi, 2008). Following the First 
World War it became clear that men who experienced “combat hysteria” or “shell shock” (Leys, 
2000, p. 21, 22) suffered not from organic conditions but from psychic distress. Freud then adapted 
his theorization of hysteria by reframing trauma “in quasi-military terms as a widespread rupture 
or breach in the ego’s protective shield” (Leys, 2000, p. 23). This conceptualization of trauma is 
reminiscent of the passive, permeable female body in classical medical texts (Shildrick, 1997). It 
was therefore not surprising that medical interest in trauma declined thereafter, as men presenting 
with combat hysteria were treated with indifference or accused of malingering, likely responses 
stemming from the states’ needs for a strong, masculine national image (Herman, 1997; Leys, 
2000). It was not until the 1980s, when activism supporting Vietnam War veterans led to the 
inclusion of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a psychiatric diagnosis by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), were women’s experiences of sexual violence recognized and 
folded into legitimized conceptualization of trauma. Thus, it could be argued that women’s 
emotional distress and experiences of sexual violence had been deemed normative and 
unremarkable, such that trauma gained medical and public attention largely through men’s 
narratives of suffering, which were regarded as unusual plight given their presumed ontological 
stability and coherence. 
     
Freud has consistently emphasized that it is not the event itself that is experienced by the person 
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as traumatic, but it is the memory of such events, rendered through psychic processes and drives, 
that forms traumatic symptoms (Bergo, 2007; Leys, 2000). The legacy of this theorization 
valourizes therapeutic efforts to recuperate an event of violence that has “occurred in a place and 
at a time that are, by definition, distance from here, from now” (Stevens, 2016, p. 33), which runs 
the risk of obscuring the ongoing violence in social life and its impacts on individuals’ ways of 
being and community relations (Millions, 2013; Stevens, 2016). Furthermore, the understanding 
of trauma-in-the-past is predicated on assumptions of a linear sequence of events and a pre-trauma, 
“whole, pure, and mature” (Stevens, 2016, p. 35) subject, whose existence is verified and 
recoverable by the recounting of injuries that have damaged it. While there is an ongoing 
movement of feminist and anti-oppressive approaches in counselling therapy and social work that 
seek to politicize gender-based violence and empower survivors (Brown, 2011), therapeutic 
approaches to sexual assault are still commonly grounded in developmental psychology, which 
assumes a fully autonomous, non-abused subject who follows a set of normative stages of growth 
toward mature sexuality, thereby positioning women who have experienced violence as childlike, 
lacking in agency (Egan, 2016), “inevitably disordered” (Ussher, 2011, p. 128), and “eternally 
damaged” (Appignanesi, 2008, p. 469). This construction of women who have experienced 
violence can be understood as grounded in an ableist view of human development, whereby the 
masculine, autonomous adult figure functions as the norm and the ideal end of what it means to be 
fully human, against which the disabled person is compared and constructed as childlike, halted in 
development, and therefore defective (Carlson, 2010). Murphy (2007) argues that sexual violence 
can also be understood as a “re-enactment of sexual difference upon the bodies of its victims… 
that seeks to reduce those victims not to their own bodies but to a fantasized body of woman” (p. 
75). As such, the feminized subject is always already interpellated as passive and vulnerable in 
this relation of sexual difference, in addition to emotionally unstable, irrational, and lacking in 
boundary (Ahmed, 2004; Lloyd, 1996; Shildrick, 1997). It then follows that, if the coherent, self-
contained subject is valourized as the goal of successful recovery, then it poses an impossible quest 
for women and racialized others, as one cannot recover what one is assumed to have never had.   
                       
Fixing Anger: Biopolitics through Trauma 
  
According to Herman (1997), whose book Trauma and Recovery is often cited as seminal in 
clinical trauma study, trauma entails events that “overwhelm the ordinary systems of care that give 
people a sense of control, connection, and meaning” (p. 33). In popular and clinical narratives, 
concepts of trauma such as that which delineated by Herman exemplify attempts to make sense of 
events that disrupt ideology of the self as coherent, rational, with a recognizable and controllable 
interiority (Stevens, 2016). Conceptualizations of trauma and dominant discourse of the self are 
therefore mutually constituting in propagating the belief that the “self that is subject to trauma can 
be ‘held responsible,’ can be expected to respond to intervention with self-restraint or behavior 
modifications” (Stevens, 2016, p. 25). Stevens (2016) argues that this rubric of trauma works to 
cohere the affect of those who are moved to ‘help’ and those who are ‘traumatized,’ all towards 
10 
 
“our own admission to the global community of the healed, the cured, and the normative” (p. 29). 
He further suggests that medical terms produced by such notion of trauma, namely, PTSD and 
more recently traumatic brain injury, function “as a kind of state servant and ideological apparatus” 
(p. 32) in categorizing and channeling affect into state supporting practices of population control 
in the service of capitalist gains. Practitioners’ own longings and pleasurable emotions in helping, 
achieving justice, and uncovering traumatic stories are shunted into the labour of managing the 
affects of those who have experienced violence. It is through this circuit of “bio-affective-political 
economies” (p. 35) that instruments of management operate in the forms of case histories, outcome 
measurements, and best practices, with the objectives being “the scrutinizing, the bringing under 
control, the calming down, the pacification of the subject of the state… through the provision of 
‘safety,’ ‘hope,’ ‘somatically grounded resiliency treatments’” (p. 36).  
            
This affective circuit of biopolitics shows that power does not operate to eliminate emotions 
altogether, but to control them and render them productive. Ahmed (2004) theorizes that the 
hierarchy of reason and emotion further lends itself to “a hierarchy between emotions: some 
emotions are ‘elevated’ as signs of cultivation, whilst others remain ‘lower’ as signs of weakness” 
(p. 3). Cultivated and productive emotions are defined against unruly emotions or madness, often 
signaled by their inarticulability into reified ‘feeling words’ (Gorman, 2017). Following Scarry’s 
(1985) theorization that pain is unsharable because of “its resistance to language” (p. 4) or “its 
ability to destroy language” (p. 54), emotions that flow from overwhelming violence may therefore 
be understood as inarticulable, unruly, and requiring management. The hierarchy of emotions is 
certainly a gendered construct. Ahmed (2014) references the figure of the angry wife, whose 
emotions are “understood as antisocial, as destroying ties of affection” (p. 115), a wandering away 
from the husband’s will and the general social will, which assigns cheerful nurturance to women 
as their intrinsic duty (Lloyd, 1996). Based on its historical construction hysteria can be pictured 
as a raging mad woman with a wandering womb, refusing to reproduce and nurture according to 
their “biologico-moral responsibility” (Foucault, 1990, p. 104), thus posing a threat to the stability 
of the social body. The “hysterization of women’s bodies” (Foucault, 1990) is therefore a strategy 
of disciplinary power deployed through the discourse of sexuality. While hysteria is no longer in 
use as a psychiatric diagnosis, it is often viewed as a predecessor to borderline personality disorder 
(BPD). Both diagnoses are disproportionately applied to women, both identify sexual trauma as a 
precipitating factor, the diagnostic criteria of both emphasize excess feminized emotions as well 
as emotions that defy normative femininity (Becker, 1997; Wirth-Cauchon, 2001; Ussher, 2011), 
and as such women labelled with either disorder are frequently viewed as “untreatable” (Sulzer, 
2015, p. 85). In the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 
(DSM-5) the symptoms of BPD that refer to emotionality includes: “Affective instability due to a 
marked reactivity of mood,” “Chronic feelings of emptiness,” and “Inappropriate, intense anger or 
difficulty controlling anger” (APA, 2013, 301.83). The diagnostic description implies that women 
are more prone to BPD, thus reinforcing the discursive construction of women as empty and 
chaotic (Shildrick, 1997). However, it is not difficult to deduce that women would be 
11 
 
overrepresented in a diagnosis associated with trauma when western societies are ongoingly 
sustained by a patriarchal social order that naturalizes the exploitation and subjugation of 
femininity. Moreover, feminist writers argue that since the range of socially acceptable anger is 
far greater for men than for women, judgements about anger as inappropriate are more likely to be 
made about women than men (Chesler, 1972; Wirth-Cauchon, 2001). Indeed, drawing on 
Aristotle’s maxim, Boler (1999) argues that according to western moral traditions women are not 
permitted to express anger even in the face of transgression, which served to maintain women in a 
subordinate position. It is therefore not coincidental that both hysteria and BPD emerged during 
historical periods in which existing boundaries of gender roles were challenged by increased 
education and employment opportunities for women (Wirth-Cauchon, 2001). Further, Becker 
(1997) remarks that the introduction of BPD in the DSM-3 in 1980, in conjunction with a new 
diagnostic model that centres personality traits, has served as a way for psychiatry to maintain its 
supremacy against competing professions such as psychology and social work. In recent decades 
advancements in neuroscience, proliferation of trauma studies, and recognition of the stigma 
attached to BPD have led to a shift toward the use of PTSD in diagnosing women who have 
experienced violence (Appignanesi, 2008). In DSM-5, PTSD is also marked by a “[p]ersistent 
negative emotional state (e.g., fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame)” (APA, 2013, 309.81), of which 
only anger is further explained as “quick tempered and may even engage in aggressive verbal 
and/or physical behavior with little or no provocation” (APA, 2013, 309.81). As such, following 
both Ahmed’s (2004) model of the sociality of emotion as well as Stevens’ (2016) discussion of 
bio-affective-politics, it can be argued that hysteria, BPD, and PTSD are but different iterations of 
a biopolitical apparatus that saturates the rhetoric of trauma and the traumatized subject with the 
emotion of anger as such rhetoric circulates through healthcare encounters, practices, and 
knowledge, in order to enable the ever multiplying means of systematic demarcation and 
regulation of normative femininity. Anger is therefore fixed to the traumatized subject as an 
inevitable outcome of trauma as well as a threat to social good that necessitates fixing through 
biomedical measures.  
 
Through these ahistorical and ostensibly neutral diagnostic categories, anger is understood as a 
debilitating impairment part and parcel to the rhetoric of trauma. The naturalization of impairment 
in turn produces subjects who will “identify themselves in ways that make them governable” 
(Tremain, 2006, p. 186) and productive through regimes of rehabilitation. At the same time, 
sustainment of the norm also requires the conception of the impaired, as well as a prohibition of 
this conception by rendering it culturally unintelligible (Butler, 1990). The proliferation of trauma-
related therapeutic interventions and prevention strategies that followed feminist movements had 
intensified the legal and medical scrutiny on women rather than on the men who perpetrated 
violence, whereby women were positioned as responsible for protecting themselves, which 
paradoxically naturalized male violence (Fahs, 2016; Million, 2013; Murphy, 2007). As such, 
violence in men is construed as normal, while anger in women is unintelligible except as signs of 
mental illness. Feminized constructions of pathology therefore obscures misogyny, with female 
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unreason serving to maintain the ideal of male rationality. Burstow (2003) particularly challenges 
the work of Herman (1997) in privileging psychiatric diagnosis and lobbying for an expansion of 
PTSD in the DSM. Along with Burstow, feminist scholars have argued that individualistic and 
deficit-oriented diagnostic criteria have reduced complex social damages and colonial violence to 
a list of biological symptoms (Goodman, 2015; Linklater, 2014; Tseris, 2013). Particularly, it is 
posited that for people who have experienced gender-based and racial violence emotions such as 
anxiety and rage are reasonable responses rather than signs of a mental disorder (Burstow, 2003; 
Ussher, 2011). Moreover, “outlaw emotions” (Jagger, 1989, p. 167), or emotions that are deemed 
socially unacceptable, such as anger, are reappraised as useful for feminist theorizing and activism 
(Burstow, 2003). Given that “‘anti-normative’ politics does not and cannot suspend the power of 
social norms” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 172), it is necessary for feminist politics to be self-reflective in 
examining how this move to justify anger and rage by realigning them with reason and utility may 
conversely reinforce binaries such as rationality/insanity, or productive/useless, thereby 
reinscribing the stigma of unintelligible anger and its corresponding disciplinary measures onto 
gendered, racialized, and disabled bodies who are always already marked for regulation.  
       
Loose Ends: The Precarious and Necessary Articulations of Pain 
 
What this paper has endeavoured to articulate is not so much what trauma is, but what it does in 
the ways that it is constructed and used. Particularly, it explicates trauma’s semiotic, mutually 
constituting relationship with emotions, whereby conceptualizations of trauma reproduce and 
reinforce emotions and their underlying gendered and raced relations of power when evoked or 
deployed in various domains of social life, from the development of psycho-medical technologies 
to political maneuvers in framing citizenship and sovereignty (Ahmed, 2004; Million, 2013; 
Stevens, 2016). This deconstruction and problematization of the discourse of trauma do not aim to 
negate the corporeal realities of, or the necessity of biomedical interventions for, the injuries and 
pain resulting from overwhelming and devastating events (Clare, 2017). This theoretical work 
hopes to expose how, through dominant conceptualizations of trauma, violence is relegated to the 
memory of the past, and healing is configured as an ideal in the future, while ongoing violations 
to individuals’ minds-bodies and communities in the present are effectively obscured (Clare, 
2017). Furthermore, the promise of a cure from trauma precludes understanding of colonial, racist, 
and gender-based oppression that is embedded in the very foundation of this promise (Clare, 2017).  
 
Shift from institutional care to community-based care in the Western world over the past several 
decades have led to new models of mental health care, such as the recovery model, which challenge 
medicalization of mental health and understand recovery as a social process that include access to 
resources and safety, as well as the recognition and reduction of ongoing experiences of 
discrimination, oppression, and violence in one’s life (Morrow, 2013). However, Morrow (2013) 
observes that, implemented within a neoliberal context, an individualist definition of recovery 
continues to dominate mental health services that take up the recovery model, such that the framing 
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of recovery as a personal journey leads to the reframing of social justice and human right issues as 
personal health problems, thus neglecting a broader analysis of how social relations of power and 
systemic discrimination contribute to mental distress. As such, for “mad black, Indigenous, and 
people of color, the labor of narrating our distress becomes a tricky business” (Gorman, 2017, p. 
312), as mad people’s stories are often harnessed to showcase the neoliberal objectives of ‘getting 
help.’ Nevertheless, Morrow (2013) suggests that the recovery framework has the potential to 
transform the ways society perceives and responds to people experiencing mental distress by 
creating space for and centring stories that resist psychiatric domination and connect experiences 
of distress with poverty, racism, sexism, ableism, and sanism. Million (2013) describes Indigenous 
women’s affective narratives of violence and poverty as “a canvas patiently painted with portrayals 
without explanations. You are there… but [the author] does not tell you what to think, what to 
feel” (p. 64). They are therefore affective expressions and knowledges that do not prescribe any 
framing in terms of their appropriateness or usefulness, and therefore “transgresses the way 
western knowledge works in the necessity to isolate and define” (p. 65). Similarly, Lorde (2007) 
writes that, for women, “poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence” (p. 37). It is 
not a calculated strategy, but a necessary expression and sharing of the felt knowledge of social 
horrors as well as survival that has been disavowed, for it is through naming the nameless that 
visceral responses are evoked and experiences are felt, thus compelling connections and actions 
for change (Ahmed, 2004). There is no certainty in how these stories will be perceived or felt, or 
whether they will achieve the political goals hoped for, in the contexts of always shifting discourses 
and social conditions (Butler, 1993). Perhaps the way forward is to “proceed without assuming 
there is a right direction” (Ahmed, 2017, p. 197), yet grounded in the refusal “to reproduce a world 
I cannot bear” (Ahmed, 2017, p. 199). In the study of trauma, the rejection of a certain happy end 
and readymade definitions, and the tenacious excavation of the manifold operations of power 
within the discourses of both pain and healing, are enactments of critical praxis in pursuit of a less 
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